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ISLAMISM REVISITED: 
A LACANIAN DISCOURSE CRITIQUE
Andrea Mura
In recent years a number of  studies have integrated a psychoanalytical account
of  the subject within the ‘constructivist’ interest in the formation of  identity. For
instance, in response to the ‘modernist’ attempt to describe how symbols, values
and meanings are articulated in the ‘construction’ of  national narratives,
Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras have stressed the need to understand the psychoan-
alytical factors accounting for the salience, ‘depth and longevity of  national iden-
tifications’ (Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras, 2006, p. 147)1.
Despite the increasing interest in psychoanalysis as a theoretical tool in the
interpretation of  political phenomena, this approach has remained substantially
unexplored in the context of  Islamic issues in general, and Islamism as a specif-
ic ideological formation. In addition, a longstanding suspicion of  psychoanalysis
has been manifest within Islamic settings. Much of  the scepticism seems to derive
from the common assumption that psychoanalysis propagates secularism. A case
in point is Malik Babikir Badri, an Islamic therapist writing on the popular web-
site Islam Online. According to him, while religion teaches that humans have souls,
‘Freud demolished this conception and denied the existence of  God, the soul, the
here-after and human free will’ (Badri 2002).
The precise aim of  this article is to make the case for including psychoanalysis
within the space of  a social and political analysis of  contemporary Islamist dis-
courses, enriching the limited number of  studies which have examined Islam from
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a psychoanalytic perspective (Benslama 2002; Žižek 2006a, 2006b; Hirt 1996; Pratt
Ewing 1997; Jöttkandt and Copjec 2009). To do this, I will draw on Lacanian psy-
choanalysis to focus upon those factors that may enlighten our understanding of
how Islamism is constructed as a complex discursive formation. 
The broad argument underlying this article is that Islamism, as a discursive
universe, is sustained by the master signifier ‘Islam’, which figures as the element
around which a ‘variety’ of  Islamist discourses are articulated. Looking beyond
this semiotic and discursive stratum, the master signifier ‘Islam’ also retains a
strong psychoanalytical focus, functioning as the signifying image of  the subject
upon which the self-representation of  believers is constructed. This representa-
tion is essential for the diversification of  the different modalities through which
the cathectic investments of  adherents are mobilized. 
In the following pages, a psychoanalytical inquiry into Islamism will take as its
point of  departure Fethi Benslama’s account of  the function of  the father in
Islam (Benslama, 2010). I contend that Benslama’s reading of  Islamism should be
further investigated so as to avoid potential risks of  essentialism. Benslama
asserts that Islamism constitutes a ‘delusional’ and ‘melancholic’ attempt to
‘restore’ the shield of  religious illusion against the crisis of  the traditional author-
itative system. I will argue instead for the importance of  highlighting the way in
which a number of  Islamist discourses, creatively, assertively or in a non-melan-
cholic way, re-organize symbolic economy around the master signifier Islam,
thereby reflecting the complexity of  the Islamist discursive universe. The last part
of  the article will examine the different modalities through which several Islamist
trajectories positivize the encounter with the real, mobilising jouissance for the pur-
poses of  the cathectic investment required to sustain each discursive-ideological
configuration. 
The Structuration of  Islamist Discourses
Contemporary Islamism can be considered a revivalist trend whose constitu-
tive features may be found in its intrinsic political ‘projectuality’ – that is, its ten-
dency to translate its discursive universe into effective political projects. Islamism
not only endeavours to ‘re-vive’ religious feelings by ascribing them a substantial
role in providing believers’ lives with meaning and a sense of  horizon. The pecu-
liarity of  this revivalist trend is that ‘Islam’ itself  becomes the cornerstone of  the
political and social order.
A major question arises, however, when one starts tackling Islamism empiri-
cally. How to approach this complex universe made up of  ideas, pamphlets,
organisational and legislative provisions, as well as single adherents, social move-
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ments, institutions, parties, etc.? The notion of  ‘discourse’ offers here a useful
analytical tool able to account for the inherent complexity of  this religious and
socio-political phenomenon. 
In Ernesto Laclau’s terms, a ‘discourse’ is a ‘structured totality articulating
both linguistic and non-linguistic elements’, i.e. ideas as well as organisations,
documents, etc. (Laclau 2006, p. 13). As he puts it elsewhere: 
the basic hypothesis of  a discursive approach is that the very possibility of  per-
ception, thought and action depends on the structuration of  a certain meaningful
field which pre-exists any factual immediacy (Laclau 1993, p. 431).
To conceive of  Islamism as a discourse is to uncover the structuring of  the
discursive field from which a range of  social phenomena receive their particular
meaning, and through which their very possibility is conferred. If  we start with
reference to ‘Islam’ itself, what does it then mean for Islamism to be considered
as the discourse that primarily poses ‘Islam’ as the cornerstone of  the political
and social order? 
In answer to this question, Bobby S. Sayyid assigned to Islam the discursive
role of  a master signifier. As Sayyid pointed out, it might be said that Islam func-
tions as a central element in a plurality of  discourses, i.e. fiqh (jurisprudence of
Islamic law), Islamic theology, etc. (Sayyid 1997, p. 47). As the central element of
a discourse, Islam assumes the universal function of  the nodal point or quilting point,
organising ‘retroactively and prospectively’ the range of  signifiers that condense
into that discourse (Lacan 1955–56/1993, p. 267). Such a mode of  discursive
organisation offers the illusion of  a referent, temporarily freezing the fluctuation
of  signifiers and making a process of  signification possible. A nodal point might
also aspire to assume the universal position of  a whole social and discursive sys-
tem, conferring a fictional and provisional sense of  closure to that system by way
of  a unique signifying gesture. This means suturing temporarily a definite social space,
representing its discursive totality. The universal position that a nodal point covers
here can best be grasped through the expression master signifier, which highlights
the ability of  the nodal point to ‘order’ a chain of  signifiers, giving meaning to all
the elements that compose it. This expression is particularly useful when consid-
ering the attempt of  a nodal point to face a process of  social and discursive
desedimentation, representing the whole society, and therein allowing significa-
tion within its provisional frontiers. As Žižek puts it: ‘Let us imagine a confused
situation of  social disintegration, in which the cohesive power of  ideology loses
its efficiency: in such a situation, the Master is the one who invents a new signi-
fier, the famous ‘quilting point,’ which stabilizes the situation again and makes it
readable’ (Žižek 2006c, p. 37). In achieving this stabilization, the master signifier
provides all identities circulating in that space with both a common discursive
horizon and the signifying image upon which their self-representation is construct-
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ed. Žižek defines the master-signifier as the sound – as Žižek says – that holds
the community together; ‘the Thing’, which ontologically constitutes a commu-
nity because subjects ‘believe’ in ‘it’ (Žižek 1990, p. 53). It is here that Islamism
emerges as the discursive universe aimed at hegemonising a whole social horizon,
transforming ‘Islam’ into the master signifier of  the community. 
A Psychoanalytical Reading of  Islamist Articulations
In the light of  a discourse-centred perspective, Islamism stands then as a uni-
fied yet ‘complex’ discursive universe. That is, one should acknowledge the ‘plu-
rality’ of  discursive manifestations in which the Islamist vision is expressed, each
one aspiring to assume a universal position through a particular way of  mobilis-
ing the master signifier ‘Islam’. For each Islamist discourse, this means organis-
ing a particular manner of  eliciting passions and identifications, thereby arousing
a degree of  affective investment. It is here that the analytical relationship between
psychoanalysis and religion becomes crucial. By taking Freud’s analysis of  religion
as a useful point of  departure, I will now examine those psychoanalytical aspects
that best sustain the force of  the Islamist imaginary, allowing for a differentiation
among key Islamist articulations.
According to Freud, religion grounds its ‘inner force’ and ‘efficacy’ in its
capacity for illusion. Illusion is a force immanently related to desire and the actu-
ality of  imaginary formations (Freud 1927). It is the force of  an energetic denial
of  reality through which a tutelary power modelled around the figure of  the
father is established to protect the subject from the anxiety of  loss.
Freud’s analysis of  religion offers an interesting starting point from which to
posit a Lacanian reading of  Islamism. The Freudian illusion of  a tutelary power
of  God at the base of  religious representations promises to satisfy what Lacan
described as the impossible task of  fulfilling subjective lack. In this sense, the
Islamist ‘illusion’ acts in the same way as any other discourse. Master signifiers
always require the production of  a specific idea of  ‘closure and fullness’, func-
tioning as ‘(impossible) ideals’ around which a society is organized and centred
(Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, p. 8). Given this impossibility, an inquiry into
Islamist discourses should highlight the particular link established between their
master signifier and the imaginary structure to which they refer. An examination
should therefore be undertaken of  the particular status that the figure of  the
father enjoys within religious representations, so as to address questions of  ori-
gin and authority. 
In the attempt to tackle such issues, Fethi Benslama has linked the emergence
of  Islamism to the progressive erosion of  the traditional imaginary that followed
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Islam’s encounter with western modernity (Benslama 2002). Benslama identifies
two major demands that his generation of  Muslims articulated in the Tunisia of
the 1960s. Firstly, the desire of  being another – where ‘the other’ from the perspec-
tive of  post-colonial populations was the West – materialising either in the direct
replacement or in the re-articulation of  Islamic tradition with modern language. 
Secondly, Benslama recognizes an emerging demand for authenticity, or as he
puts it, the desperation of  being a self. What is advocated and asserted is a return to
origin; that is, the attempt to restore the truth of  Islamic law and tradition, there-
by restoring the imaginary tutelary coordinates of  religion:
The torment of  origin is a symptom of  the undoing of  the traditional solidarity
between truth and law (haqiqa and sharia), leaving the subject with an excess of  the
real and jouissance, which horrifies him because he cannot find anything within his
imaginary universe and antique symbolism to block its release. The appeal to origin
reflects the hope of  restoring the shield of  religious illusion. (Benslama, 2002, p. 23).
In the above passage, the ‘real’ stands in opposition to the imaginary-symbol-
ic as ‘the domain of  whatever subsists outside symbolisation’ (Lacan 1966, p. 65).
It is this mysterious, traumatic force, the ‘nightmarish apparition’ that always
exceeds the symbolic of  language, that reminds us of  the very impossibility of
mastering the constitutive lack of  human experience (Žižek 2002, p. 19). 
In addition, at the centre of  Benslama’s argument is the particular relation that
the symbolic structure establishes with jouissance, the unlimited ‘enjoyment’ that
we need to renounce once we enter the symbolic order. Here a basic distinction
should be made between jouissance as the force sustaining the structure of  desire
and its symbolic economy (phallic jouissance) and feminine jouissance. On the one
hand, jouissance stands as a ‘painful pleasure’ which is always excessive for the
physical survival of  the subject (Lacan, 1959–60, p. 184). This means that a
homeostatic limit is imposed on bodily pleasure in order for it to be bearable to
the subject, thus producing prohibition and the very desire to transgress it.
Jouissance consequently appears as intimately related to the structure of  human
desire.
But in seminar XX Lacan identifies another form of  jouissance that is not phal-
lic, and which escapes localisation, symbolisation, knowledge, and desire. It fig-
ures as a bodily substance which relates to the body proper as singular experience,
and which cannot be shared or limited: it is ‘the substance of  the body, on the
condition that it is defined only as that which enjoys itself  (se jouit)’ (Lacan, 1972,
p.23). This type of  jouissance should be conceived as an ‘other jouissance’ or ‘femi-
nine jouissance’ which escapes the symbolic function epitomized by the phallus and
figures as an excessive and singular jouissance of  the Other. By examining mystical
figures such as Saint John of  the Cross and Saint Teresa, Lacan paradigmatically
relates such feminine jouissance to God.
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From this perspective, it is justifiable to claim that Islam initially preserved the
‘real’ excess of  God as feminine jouissance. In this way, God was maintained in the
domain of  the impossible-real, the jouissance of  the Other beyond the symbolic
function of  the father. In contrast, Judaism and Christianity can be described as
early attempts to progressively subsume this impossibility within the stabilising
frontiers of  symbolisation. ‘God’ was linked to a paternal and familial logic to the
extent that Judaism could be defined as the ‘religion of  the Father’, and
Christianity as the ‘religion of  the Son’ (Hirt 1984, p. 11).
This patriarchal order found institutional representation in the genealogical
lineage of  Abraham’s son Isaac, who was born of  the marriage between Abraham
and his wife Sarah the Hebrew, and was allowed to claim full inheritance of
Abraham (Genesis 21:10–12; Gal 4:30). In the Bible, it is Isaac whom God choos-
es to establish the Covenant with Abraham’s descendants, and who gives birth to
Jewish genealogy (Genesis 17:19–21). The relation with Isaac that God institu-
tionalizes with the Covenant and through circumcision and obedience to the Law,
allows the Jews to assume Abraham as the symbolic father of  the community
(Name-of-the-Father). Hence Abraham, thanks to the relation with his son Isaac,
becomes the ‘phallic solution of  the paternal symbolic authority, of  the official
symbolic lineage’ (Žižek 2006a). In Judaism and Christianity, the relation between
man and God reflects a paternal logic of  filiation. The impossibility that God
expresses thus becomes an impossible-real to be subjected to symbolic appropri-
ation. 
In contrast, Islamic tradition celebrates the link with Ishmael, the son that
Abraham procreated with Sarah’s Egyptian servant Hagar. Following a request
from Sarah, Abraham ‘abandoned’ Hagar and her son Ishmael in the desert,
thereby thwarting this son’s right of  inheritance. Although God promised Hagar
to make Ishmael the founder of  a great nation (a promise that Muslims see real-
ized with Muhammad’s foundation of  the Islamic community), Ishmael’s aban-
donment and exclusion from Abraham’s inheritance creates an obstacle to
Abraham’s symbolic role as a father. A biological dimension alone remains to link
Ishmael with Abraham, who is now reduced to the role of  biological procreator.
What needs to be emphasized, therefore, is the original absence of  the function
of  the father in Islam, best exemplified by Ishmael’s biblical ‘abandonment’ in the
desert. A similar destiny is reserved for the founder of  Islam, Muhammad, who
was an ‘orphan’. In contrast, a central role in Islam is originally played by female
figures such as Hagar, the non-Hebrew. 
In Benslama’s recently translated essay, Psychoanalysis and the Challenge of  Islam
(2002), Hagar epitomizes the ancestral mother of  Islam, the ‘female foreigner’
who made the Islamic community possible by giving birth to Ishmael. In Islamic
tradition, Hagar incarnates pure feminine jouissance both because she has knowl-
edge of  otherness (Other jouissance) and fully expresses bodily substance. Paul, for
instance, recalls that Hagar can see and speak with God without dying. She knows
him, names him, and, bodily speaking, expresses a perverse, seductive and fertile
force, allowing progeny beyond symbolic castration and so accessing ‘that which
is hidden’ (ibid, p. 111). 
Therefore, in the face of  the phallic function ascribed to Abraham, which
grounds the god-father relationship at the core of  Jewish and Christian symbol-
ism, Islam was grounded in the excessive force epitomized by the Other jouissance
of  Hagar in her direct relation to God. God is therefore retained in the domain
of  the Impossible, since no phallic solution existed to organize the relation
between man and God on the grounds of  paternal symbolic authority. The
Koran claims that Allah is not the father, for the uniqueness of  God excludes any
notion of  divine procreation, filiation and genealogy, even symbolically: 
Say: He is God, (the) One; the Self-Sufficient Master, Whom all creatures need; He
has begotten no one, nor is He begotten; and there is no one comparable to Him.
(Qur’an 112:1). 
With the passing of  time, however, God’s sovereignty was gradually trans-
posed into a symbolic representation aimed at doubling God’s absolute identity
in the dual relation between the Man-Father and the son. In this regard, Benslama
notes that although Islam was initially exposed to the generative and excessive
energy of  Other jouissance, the subversive power of  femininity became increas-
ingly subordinated to an ethical, juridical and theological order (Law and truth)
structured through a phallic organisation of  the signifying universe. This passage
entailed the ‘obliteration of  the ancestral mother’ and her reduction to a mere
intermediary serving as the ‘physical conduit for routing the form of  the father
to that of  the son’ (Benslama 2002, p. 109). The eradication of  the ancestral
mother was the attempt to master the excessive power of  feminine jouissance by
reducing Other jouissance to the symbolic economy of  sexual enjoyment. A system
of  laws was then established on the basis of  male sovereignty.
But, in this reading, elusive female power resists phallic symbolisation and the
symbolic mission of  eradication never succeeds in mastering this excessive force.
The ‘spectre of  the woman’ that was obliterated has haunted Islamic thought up
to the present day. The encounter with modernity and the challenge to tradition-
al imaginary enacted a new, horrifying exposure to the excess of  Other jouissance,
thereby unleashing the ‘traumatic-subversive-creative-explosive power of  femi-
nine subjectivity’ (Žižek 2006a). For Benslama, Islamism figures as the symptom
of  ‘the profound disturbance in the ever precarious relation between the real and
symbolic structures’, a disturbance Islamists have tried to solve with their ‘delu-
sional appeal to origin’ (Benslama 2002, p. 214).
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The Decline of  the Oedipus
Benslama’s account of  a dislocation of  the traditional symbolic authority of
the father which modernity would produce, thereby engendering a horrifying
release of  the real, strongly resonates with a recent debate about a paradigmatic
change that is occurring in our contemporary era (Tort 2007). Here, the idea is
that post-modernity, rather than modernity, would be responsible for what has
been called the ‘decline of  the Oedipus, when the paradigmatic mode of  subjec-
tivity is no longer the subject integrated into the paternal Law through symbolic
castration’ (Žižek 2000, p. 248). 
Naturally, a major consequence of  this view is the crisis of  desire. Once cas-
tration is suspended, ‘desire’ ceases to be a key manifestation of  the subject of
the unconscious, and is faced with a sort of  ‘nihilistic obliteration’ which gives
rise to the birth of  a new type a subject: the ‘Man without Unconscious’
(Recalcati 2010, p. X). In his recent essay on the clinics of  new symptoms,
Lacanian theorist Massimo Recalcati, sees anorexia, panic disorders and somati-
sation as the signs of  a potential abrogation of  the unconscious. Two increasing-
ly widespread tendencies would be indicative of  such an abrogation: ‘a narcissis-
tic reinforcement of  the ego, producing solid identifications, which petrify sterilely
subjective identity’ [emphasis mine]; and an ‘urgent need to enjoy, which bypass-
es any principle of  symbolic mediation so as to stand as an absolute as well as
deadly injunction’ (ibid.). 
In this scenario, religious fundamentalist attachment to integrity and purity is
thus interpreted as a mode of  solid identification, chasing the paranoiac dream of
an uncorrupted and uncontaminated self  protected against the threats of  other-
ness. The risk here is that the complexity of  the Islamist galaxy is reduced to a
pure, nostalgic fundamentalist manifestation, acting from beyond the death of
desire. Benslama’s reading of  Islamism seems to embrace such a possibility,
depicting Islamism as the ultimate attempt to ‘restore’ the shield of  illusion in a
time when the ‘traditional’ symbolic authority of  the father has been disrupted by
the exposure to modernity and the release of  jouissance. Thus, a traditionalist and
nostalgic character is ascribed to Islamism, which is exemplified by its ‘desperate
appeal to origin’. Needless to say, this can result in the deployment of  ‘neo-ori-
entalist’ forms of  essentialism about Islamism (Almond 2007). ‘Traditionalist’ and
‘nostalgic’ attitudes are thus emphasized, while compromising and creative
engagements with modernity are neglected, thereby promoting modernist depic-
tions of  ‘political Islamism’ as ‘nothing but one of  the subjectivated names of
today’s obscurantism’ (Badiou 2006, p. 68). 
Against this backdrop, I contend that a variety of  approaches mark the dis-
cursive responses that the Islamist galaxy actualizes when confronting social
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desedimentation and symbolic instability. I argue that Islamism does not manifest
itself  as an undifferentiated demand for authenticity, unwilling to find compro-
mise with modernity. 
By emphasising the multiplicity of  the discursive variants informing the
Islamist galaxy, Benslama’s contribution could be enriched with a higher degree
of  complexity. From this perspective, the decline of  the Oedipus might be asso-
ciated with the desedimenting effects of  globalisation and the emergence of  post-
modernity as a discursive horizon challenging the role of  logocentric modern
representations (Mura 2012b). Whether this decline is acknowledged or not, how-
ever, very much depends on which horizon (e.g., tradition, modernity, post-
modernity) we use to ‘read’ social reality and the type of  discourse we are con-
sidering. Žižek, for instance, emphasizes the contemporary overlapping of
modernity and postmodernity, desire and perversion, rather than their mutual
replacement: e.g., the modern discourse of  democracy, which manifests a hyster-
ical structure and values the central function of  desire on the one hand, and the
post-modern discourse of  late capitalism, with its perverse injunction to enjoy, on
the other (Žižek 2000, p. 248). 
From this perspective, there is nothing particularly epochal on the current
trouble of  the symbolic that Benslama describes, for the ‘symbolic’ is always in
trouble and disturbed by contingent events that challenge temporary fixation of
meanings, enacting new hegemonic competitions among discourses. While
‘events’ such as colonialism or globalisation produce violent reconfigurations of
our imaginaries, engendering what Benslama sees as the ‘undoing of  the tradi-
tional solidarity between truth and law (haqiqa and sharia)’, the encounter with the
real that such events entail might not necessarily produce the ‘torment of  origin’
or the ‘horrifying’, ‘delusional’, ‘desperate’ attitude that Benslama suggests for
Islamists. Indeed, by trying to exploit the desedimenting process of  social and
discursive dislocation, Islamism functions in the same way as any other discursive
formation, re-signifying the social universe through hegemonic conflict.
Therefore, to use the ‘creative’ and ‘traumatic’ force of  the real to reconfigure the
borders of  symbolic organisation entails stabilising a situation of  social disinte-
gration, by assuming ‘a new master signifier which makes that situation ‘readable’’
(Žižek 2006c, p. 37). 
I propose that instead of  seeing Islamism as a form of  solid identification
marking the death of  desire and the nostalgic attempt to ‘restore’ the illusion of
religion, Islamist discourses should be read as distinct attempts to confront desed-
imentation creatively – in other words, as different ways of  mobilising the pro-
ductive force of  the real within the realm of  a symbolic economy. Central to this
approach is the idea that Islamism does not necessarily attempt to ‘restore’ sym-
bolic economy on the ground of  anti-imperialist acts of  resistance advocating pre-
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colonial ‘authenticity’. Even in the early history of  Islamist movements, groups
such as the Muslim Brothers simply strived to re-articulate or re-invent symbolic
coordinates by adopting the very ‘modern’ language of  the colonialist (Lia, 1998;
Mura, 2012a). Far from displaying melancholic or rigid attitudes towards change,
many groups continue to preserve the central function of  desire, ‘positivizing’ the
very encounter with the real that Benslama preserves as horrifying. 
Given the limits of  this article, it is not possible to describe in detail how such
a process occurs for each Islamist discourse. Nonetheless, in the following pages,
I explore briefly a few examples of  the way in which such a positivisation of  the
real can occur, giving a taste of  how some Islamist discourses resort to a creative
mobilisation of  jouissance. 
Fantasy, Desire, jouissance and the Discourses of Islam
As I mentioned above, any evaluation of  the way in which Islamism organiz-
es the relations among fantasy, desire and jouissance should stress the positive deter-
mination of  the real. This is a notion of  jouissance which allows the real to be man-
ifested. The real here is not only the negative and traumatic moment of  disrup-
tion of  the symbolic, but the excessive energy that emanates from the very ideal-
isation of  a fulfilment of  the lack (Glynos and Stavrakakis 2004). It discloses a par-
adoxical situation by demonstrating the inability of  the symbolic to master social
lack while enacting, at the same time, the very illusion of  a final fulfilment. 
It is here that fantasy and desire best reveal their potential for the cathectic
investment of  Islamist ‘illusions’. Faced with the loss of  jouissance that the subject
experiences, desire represents a relation to lack that promises to recapture the
object sacrificed. Lacan deploys the notion of  object petit a to conceive of  the unat-
tainable object which ‘causes’ and sets desire in motion through the representa-
tion of  partial objects. As a cause-object of  desire, object petit a represents a
desirous and phantasmatic feature that can reside in any object. From this per-
spective, it functions as a sort of  formal frame through which desire maintains
ontological consistency despite the positive object that is encountered. At a deep-
er level, however, object petit a mediates between desire and enjoyment, function-
ing as a stand in for the real within any symbolic representation. Here, object petit
a can be seen as ‘an empty space on which the subject projects the fantasies that
support his desire, a surplus of  the real that propels us to narrate again and again
our first traumatic encounter with jouissance’ (Žižek 1991, p. 133). The object petit a
reflects, then, the residual accumulation of  a form of  enjoyment in the symbol-
ic, which fantasy strives to mobilize bringing it within acceptable limits (that is,
tempering its excessive force by translating it into bodily pleasure). From this per-
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spective, fantasy stands as the ‘little scenario of  imaginarily fixed signifiers circling
around the ultimate object of  desire’ (Kesel 2009, p. 31). It is the fundamental
relation between the master signifier and the object petit a that needs to be uncov-
ered so as to explain the ability of  Islamist articulations to stimulate, produce and
appropriate the cathectic investments of  a discourse. 
By examining a wide variety of  case studies, Yannis Stavrakakis has highlight-
ed this ability of  desire and fantasy to unleash libidinal investment, which could
be seen in terms of  an ‘enjoyment structured in fantasies’ (Stavrakakis 2006, p.
200). From this perspective, any discourse (nationalism, socialism, etc.) presents
its master signifier (the Nation, The Socialist Society, etc.) as an ‘empty signifier’
that symbolizes both the essential lack and the exciting promise of  its fulfilment.
It is this very excitement that discourses try to capture and mobilize for political
purposes, and that reveals the positive characterisation of  the real. In the discur-
sive universe of  Islamism, ‘Islam’ incarnates the object somehow ‘lacking’: all
problems deriving from its very loss, its being ‘missing’, and this lack being con-
ceived of  as an intimate deprivation. 
A common characteristic of  Islamic revivalist groups is the claim that ‘Islam’,
their empty signifier, is absent in the every-day life of  regular Muslims, because it
is ‘lying dormant within their souls’ (al-Banna 1935). This ‘absence’ is then taken
as the primary cause of  social injustice and individual malaise. The negative
absence of  the ‘object’ is, at the same time, positivized by fantasy. Once ‘Islam’
returns fully through the ‘Islamisation of  society’ in the fantasy of  a harmonious
and balanced state, all problems will be solved. It is at this point that fantasy proj-
ects the possibility of  solution by promising a ‘revival’ of  Islam and the perspec-
tive of  a peaceful settlement of  all human problems: hence, the very popular
Islamist slogan: Islam is the solution. But what makes fantasy ‘appealing’ is that some-
thing exceeds the order of  language in which fantasy and desire are inscribed and
connects the symbolic with the real as the pre-symbolic energy of  the subject. 
Since fantasy works through visualisation, each discursive articulation will dis-
play the partial object of  desire differently. The fantasy of  a Muslim society, for
example, very often takes the form either of  a stylisation of  the Past or a utopian visu-
alisation of  the Future. Although these tendencies are common to all Islamist dis-
courses, each articulation tends to emphasize one tendency more than the other.
In any case, they reveal different attempts to face both the encounter with the real
that social and discursive desedimentation has enacted (either as an effect of
colonialism or globalisation) and the endeavour to capture and mobilize jouissance
in order to sustain their ideological platform. 
So-called salafi trajectories (the word refers literally to the ‘pious ancestors’),
for instance, focus on the ‘Golden Age’ of  early Islam when the Islamic com-
munity was incarnated by the image of  the Prophet and his Companions. The
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exaltation of  ‘origin’ that Benslama envisages reflects here the idyllic view of
Islamic past. The powerful nostalgia at work here precludes any possibility of
developing a utopian project, for nothing in the future will ever reach the ultimate
perfection of  the Islamic golden age. As mentioned earlier, this attitude has often
been considered to be somehow intrinsic to fundamentalist and Islamist tenden-
cies within the Sunni galaxy. Benslama, for instance, argues that, aside from ter-
ror, ‘melancholy becomes the only stance to assume while waiting for the last
judgment. The Islamist movement should be considered as a reversal of  mes-
sianism: antimessianism as despair over time’ (Benslama, 2002, p. 28). In contrast,
the messianic expectation of  Shiite factions is said to entail a more open attitude
towards utopian prospects, projecting the ideal of  the Islamic community direct-
ly into the future. As can be seen from these two contrasting attitudes, Islamist
articulations are highly differentiated in the way that they fantasize about the
Islamic community, and engage with notions of  origin and change. 
It is certainly true that some articulations among the Sunni universe reveal
nostalgia for the past. This is observable in those groups that privilege a literalist
reading of  holy texts, with a strict adherence to the timeless model of  early Islam.
Conservative trajectories such as the Taliban and the Tablighi, for instance, chan-
nel the libidinal investment of  adherents towards a representation of  the Islamic
society where the idealized image of  the past is even translated into the concrete
adoption of  a strict code of  mimetic dressing and behaviour. Selfhood is reduced
to a homogeneous kit of  norms and codes that, being deculturized and based
only on the tenets of  Islam, can be deployed in every cultural and geographical
environment in a similar way. In referring to these groups, French sociologist
Olivier Roy uses the illuminating concept of  ‘neo-fundamentalism’ (Roy 2004). 
However, other Sunni trajectories adopt a more ‘creative’ and ‘optimistic’ atti-
tude towards the future, creatively adding new elements to the depiction of  the
Islamic society. Their advocacy of  ‘origin’ is here instrumental to political and social
change, rather than reflecting the nostalgic aspiration to access the past. This is par-
ticularly evident in those groups where a more reformist attitude is at work. The
past here becomes a pool from which resources can be drawn to sanction a future
promise. Groups such as the Muslim Brothers or Hamas, for instance, have large-
ly drawn upon early experiences of  the Islamic community, such as the shura (con-
sultation) or the waqf (religious endowments), to legitimize parliamentary practices
or Islamize a modern concept of  national territory (Mandaville 2011). 
Other articulations may instead reveal a utopian attitude. Although the past
stands as a glorious image of  greatness and civilisation, an assertive focus on
change marks the Islamic call. This tendency characterizes, for instance, the
assertive transterritorial militancy of  Qutb’s Milestones, where Islamic society is
described as ‘not just an entity of  the past, to be studied in history’ but ‘a demand
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of  the present and a hope of  the future’ (Qutb 1964, p. 103). If  Qutb’s optimistic
slant may here cover a rhetorical function in the face of  his generally more pes-
simistic evaluation of  the present, other articulations reveal an unequivocal
demand for change that strongly contrasts with the image of  Islamism as a move-
ment irremediably condemned to the melancholy of  the past. 
A case in point is Shabbir Akhtar’s advocacy of  an Islamic ‘theology of  liber-
ation’, calling for the enfranchisement of  the Muslim masses in a politics that can
raise them up from poverty, oppression and injustice in a similar way to the polit-
ical experience of  Christian priests in Latin America. While the political dimen-
sion of  Islam constitutes the premises of  such a stance, what is set in motion here
is a direct reference to Qutb’s activism. Far from denoting a melancholic attitude,
cathectic investment is here explicitly directed towards the aim of  conquering
power for political and emancipatory purposes. 
Our pursuit of  power is as natural and instinctive as the sex drive. The real ques-
tion concerns its regulation. For all ideologies survive by courtesy of  power. That
is why there is a fraud, if  a pious one, in the claim that authentically religious ambi-
tion can […] afford to disown ‘the things of  Caesar’ (Akhtar 1991, p. 84). 
Finally, within a ‘transterritorial’ horizon, other articulations turn their focus
away from the past and direct their imaginative effort towards the visualisation of
a substantially new future object of  desire, a new Islamic era. This horizon is well
illustrated in those discourses that fantasize about the emergence of  a new e-
ummah transcending geographical and physical frontiers, (hence their potential
qualification as trans-territorial). 
It should be noted that, besides the articulation of  the signifier ‘Islamic soci-
ety’, which is taken here to incarnate the empty signifier Islam as such, another
key signifier in this type of  discourses is ‘virtuality’. This term can be used with a
different connotation to that of  its usual sense. A common attitude among con-
servative groups resonating with the more radical aspects of  Qutb’s vision, such
as Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun for instance, is to consider the ignorance of
divine guidance (jahiliyyah) as embracing all contemporary societies. Hence the
ummah is assumed as a ‘virtual’ object; that is, as a mental promise. 
‘Virtuality’ implies the idea that something is missing from the physical reali-
ty of  the subject. The ‘virtual’ functions as a phantasmic projection of  reality
based on a notion of  absence. An essential element for this kind of  discourse is the
‘normative self ’, the so-called ‘true believer’, with his/her quest for salvation. The
virtual ummah of  ‘true believers’ is neither an entity to be maintained, nor a goal
to be realized in a material world where unbelievers seem to dominate, regardless
of  whether they call themselves Muslims or otherwise. As the official website of
Hizb ut-Tahrir puts it, the ‘Islamic world’ is currently steeped in the dimension of
kufr (here standing for unbelief), which means that the ummah is transposed to an
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ideal plane: ‘With regard to determining whether a household is Islamic or not,
this is not dependent on whether its inhabitants are Muslims or not, but rather
on what is implemented in terms of  rules […] The fact that the current existing
states in the Islamic world are states of  kufr is evident and does not require expla-
nation’ (Hizb-ut-Tahrir, n.d.). The ummah here works therefore as a pure ideal, the
articulation of  a notion of  ‘beyond’ (thereafter) upon which to fantasize so as to
stimulate affective attachment and political mobilisation. 
In other cases, presence rather than absence can be valorized, and virtuality can
be conceived of  as a sort of  ‘illusion of  presence’ that reproduces physical reali-
ty through artificial and mechanical simulation. Virtual communities require the dis-
appearance of  the very difference 
between ‘true life’ and its mechanical simulation; between objective reality and our
false (illusory) perception of  it; between my fleeting affects, feelings, attitudes, and
so on, and the remaining hard core of  my Self  (Žižek 1997, p. 133).
In this scenario, there are Islamist trajectories that translate the virtual ummah
into a positive and feasible project. Complex networks of  websites, chat forums,
newsletters, blogs, bulletin boards etc., give voice to an extraordinary exchange of
opinions and information about every aspect of  a Muslim’s life, paving the way
for the establishment of  new forms of  community ties. Here, the ‘desirability’
and ‘visibility’ of  a new ‘virtual’ infrastructural space overcome the practical
obstacles posed by the territorial displacement of  globalisation, working as an
immediate plan of  action. It is within this context that different kinds of  con-
temporary phenomena such as Muxlim can be observed (Teti and Mura 2009).
Muxlim – a virtual world made of  digital towns, cities, buildings, parks, etc. – pro-
viding an Islamic alterative to secular British or US virtual-world developers (e.g.,
Second Life) and allowing Muslim ‘virtual citizens’ to create a new virtual com-
munity through the interaction of  movable avatars. 
Novelties of  this kind, however, require some emphasis being placed on the
imaginary that virtual reality sets in motion. André Nusselder notices that virtual
reality best exemplifies the phantasmically-mediated process leading to identity
formation. Virtual reality enables the avatar to offer a consistent self-image of  the
user producing the same effects of  fascination that the virtual ‘image’ of  a mirror
engenders in the uncoordinated and fragmented body of  an infant (Nusselder
2009, p.144). This is pivotal to understanding the fascination that the virtual ummah
elicits from those Muslims who are more absorbed in the virtual reality, and more
drawn to exploring the potential of  virtual worlds and communities. The libidinal
force of  this kind of  fascination lies in the ability of  virtual reality to capture the
user in the phantasmic projection of  its imaginary universe. The tension that char-
acterizes the relation between ideal images and the real is replaced here by a nar-
cissistic stupor and total absorption in the unity of  the virtual image. The Muslim
European Journal of  Psychoanalysis – n. 1 - 2014
120
fantasy about an ‘un-fragmented’ ummah becomes here the microworld where the
new cyber-self  experiences the dream of  absolute unity and the ultimate aspira-
tion to overcome traditional divisions within the ummah. 
The attempt on behalf  of  fantasy and desire to capture and mobilize cathec-
tic investment can be observed from other perspectives. As Stavrakakis puts it:
apart from the promise of  fantasy, what sustains desire, what drives our identifica-
tion acts, are at least two further dimensions: our ability to go through limit-expe-
riences related to a jouissance of  the body, and the fact that desiring itself  entails a
jouissance of  its own — an enjoyment beyond the anticipation of  fantasmatic full-
ness (Stavrakakis 2005, p. 69).
Enjoyment, in fact, may intervene on another level, as a partial experience
through which ‘desire’ is enjoyed. This requires some form of  anticipation of  the
joy that is promised with the future achievement of  the desired object. More pre-
cisely, it is this anticipation that sustains the promise of  the object. In the Islamist
context, for instance, Islamist articulation presents a rich and highly diversified
portfolio of  ‘experiences’. These experiences stimulate an enjoyment of  the body,
undertaking the essential function of  sustaining desire by offering morsels of
anticipation of  the promised object. 
From religious collective festivities in the case of  Ramadan, to the partial inte-
gration of  some of  the ‘ecstatic’ rituals of  Sufism, and collective funeral proces-
sions that are often charged with political significance, as in the case of  the killing
of  ‘martyrs’, religious and cultural celebrations offer important venues to mobi-
lize enjoyment among groups (Pratt Ewing 1997). In emphasising the affinity
between nationalist movements and groups such as Hamas, Hizbollah or, earlier,
the Muslim Brotherhood, scholars have often highlighted the importance given here
to hymns and paramilitary parades (Lia 1998; Kepel 2002; Ruthven 2004). All
these celebrations fortify the sense of  cohesion of  their adherents providing
them with a certain release of  enjoyment which functions precisely as a form of
partial experience. 
Similarly, more ‘conservative’ trends may attempt to anticipate some of  the
benefits that are promised in the ideal of  an ummah of  true believers. It is within
this context that the creation of  ‘Islamic neighbourhoods’ should be interpreted.
I refer here to local communities of  ‘true believers’ whose substantial ‘insulation’
from the rest of  the world keeps them apart from impiety and corruption and in
doing so, offers them a foretaste of  the kingdom of  virtue and salvation they
aspire to. Another interesting phenomenon is the creation of  ‘Islamic’ tourist
facilities (holiday villages, hotels, and so on) where the true believer can ‘enjoy’
the benefits of  a holiday reflecting their ideal of  a pure ‘Islamic’ life.
As a conservative religious concept, it [Islamic Tourism] aims at the adjustment of
the tourist industries to the fundamental interpretations of  Islam, including gen-
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der-segregated and alcohol-free venues as well as ‘Islamically’ financed and organ-
ized tourism (Dabrowska 2004).
Other discourses might involve an enjoyment of  experience drawing upon a
plurality of  more ‘ludic events’; from the actual gathering of  believers in the vir-
tual world of  Muxlim to the artistic ‘events’ of  transterritorial cultural phenomena
such as Islam-Punk and Islam hip hop. Hip hop may be regarded as one of  the
most important forms of  protest against social and political discrimination.
Spreading beyond its original African-American context, Muslim rappers have
been using music to spread the faith, bridging the gaps between Muslim commu-
nities, and creating a global ‘hip hop ummah’ (Alim 2005). ‘Islamic Punk’ is anoth-
er trend encompassing punk, hard rock, and hip hop influences. A wide range of
intellectual activities and music groups inspired by Islamic punk have given rise to
several forums, blogs and Islam-punk virtual communities (Teti and Mura 2009). 
Another important area of  analysis of  the way in which enjoyment is mobilized
within the realm of  a symbolic economy can be located in what Žižek calls the theft
of  enjoyment, which involves the constitution of  an enemy here taken to represent
the principal obstacle to the realisation of  the promise. As Žižek puts it: 
We always impute to the ‘other’ an excessive enjoyment; s/he wants to steal our
enjoyment (by ruining our way of  life) and/or has access to some secret, perverse
enjoyment (Žižek 1990, p. 54).
While fantasy and desire elicit the ‘partial’ satisfaction of  an illusory fullness,
such a narrative is disrupted by the emergence of  a paranoiac’s fantasy in which
aggressiveness and violence find their place. As a result, enjoyment irrupts in the
obscene construction of  the Other as a
traumatic Intruder, someone whose different way of  life (or, rather, way of  jouis-
sance materialized in its social practices and rituals) disturbs us, throw off  the rails
the balance of  our way of  life. (Žižek 2006b).
There is therefore a common tendency among more nationalized trajectories
à la Muslim Brotherhood to project a modern binary scheme when defining the
‘other’ that hampers the full realisation of  Islam. This can be seen in the adop-
tion of  an Occidentalist narrative through which a negative dialectic is enacted.
Islam here becomes the place of  ‘glory and fortitude, truth, strength, blessing,
integrity, stability, virtue, and nobility’ as against ‘the path of  Europe’, which is
replete with ‘enticement and glamour, pleasures and luxuries, laxity and license,
and comforts that captivate the soul’ (al-Banna 1936). 
In following a classic orientalist pattern, the enemy is maintained as a ‘necessary’
outside against which the specificity of  a Muslim-Self  can be construed. The same
dialectical mindset that informed the colonial discourse is therefore reproduced,
even though this mindset is now reversed through an anti-imperialist perspective.
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On the other hand, contemporary transterritorial trajectories within the
Islamist universe appear to reflect a classical post-modern tendency to become
disentangled from binary representations. That is not to deny that some sort of
radical contra-position is performed in the visualisation of  the enemy. When con-
sidering conservative movements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun, for
instance, it is true that these groups rely on the ultimate distinction between true
believers and non-true believers.
Nonetheless, the realm of  the enemy (jahiliyyah) is considered to be a domi-
nant space that leaves no margins for the affirmation of  any individual self.
Although a clash of  civilisation seems to inform the opposition between the
Islamic vanguard of  God and the global realm of  unbelievers, these two terms
are not posed on the same plane. While the enemy maintains absolute control
over social reality, the realisation of  a pious self  will necessarily be achieved as a
virtual accomplishment in the hereafter. As Roy puts it when describing neo-fun-
damentalism: ‘glancing over his shoulder the mujahid sees nothing but kafir (unbe-
lievers) in the lands that he is supposed to protect. […] They are besieged in a
fortress they do not inhabit’ (Roy 2004, p. 288). The outside does not defer to an
inside, and the self  will not defer to an immediate other. The very construction
of  the enemy requires that any antagonism be transposed upon a plane of  virtu-
ality and transcendence. 
Less conservative tendencies tend instead to celebrate pluralism and diversity,
dispersing the enemy in a multiplicity of  instances. The enemy can be variously
located in the form of  religious dogmatism or capitalist materialism. A phenom-
enon such as Islamic punk, for instance, is said by Michael Muhammad Knight –
a Muslim convert whose novel, The Taqwacores, represents a manifesto for the
Muslim punk movement – to unite Islam and punk within a holistic philosophy
of  life ‘smashing’ any kind of  ‘idols’, materialism and religious orthodoxy includ-
ed (Muhammad Knight 2004). If  enjoyment here is stolen or prevented by the
very existence of  an enemy, the thief  does not assume the form of  an absolute
opposite, an irreducible ‘antagonist’ against which the specificity of  a Muslim
selfhood can be delineated. Rather, the representation of  the enemy seems to be
informed by the very definition of  an ‘agonistic’ frame. Here aggression is dis-
persed into a plurality of  competing and diverging moments which define the
condition of  possibility for the theft of  enjoyment. 
Conclusion
In this article, I have framed the theoretical terrain upon which a psychoana-
lytical perspective could be posited in the analysis of  contemporary Islamist dis-
A. Mura – Islamism Revisited: A Lacanian Discourse Critique
123
courses. In the first part, I highlighted the contribution that the Lacanian con-
ceptualisation of  capitonage offers to the study of  Islamism. 
I then focused on a psychoanalytical inquiry into Islamism and how it
impinges upon problems of  ‘origin’, ‘authority’ and ‘truth’. By taking Benslama’s
investigation of  Islam as a point of  departure, I broadened the approach to
emphasize the complexity involved in an inquiry into Islamism that touches upon
the different imaginaries produced by distinct discursive articulations. By doing
this, I drew attention to the essentialist risk of  over-emphasising the ‘delusional’
character of  Islamism, and of  disregarding its internal differences. I then pro-
ceeded to highlight the way in which some Islamist discourses creatively respond
to social desedimentation, thereby reconfiguring the symbolic through a positivi-
sation of  the real. This approach served as a superior means of  differentiating the
way in which Islamism organizes and mobilizes fantasy, desire and enjoyment,
thereby sustaining the function of  the master signifier Islam. 
Naturally the hegemonic ability of  a discourse to suture social space – allow-
ing its master signifier to become universal for a given time – offers no criteria of
progressive assurance. It could be a conservative tendency that occupies the hege-
monic position of  a universal discourse. By exploring the way in which fantasies
circulate around the object of  Islam and the Islamic community, however, I
showed that new discourses have been emerging in the last decades. These dis-
courses challenge the depiction of  Islamist militants as radical and ‘melancholic’
extremists. More assertive, optimistic, innovative, and sometimes anti-dogmatic
political tendencies have arisen, enriching the discursive complexity of  Islamism.
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